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JOHN MARSHALL AND THE
LAW OF NATIONS
Edward Dumbauld t
"When the United States declared their independence, they were
bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and
refinement," according to the opinion of Mr. Justice James Wilson 1
in an important case before the Supreme Court of the United States
in which John Marshall appeared as losing counsel.
2
What was the "law of nations" or jus gentium which the infant
American republic thus accepted as part of its own law? 3  It was a
species of universal law, based on reason and bi.nding upon all man-
kind, which eighteenth century jurists did not hesitate to recognize
as valid. It embraced three principal .divisions,: the law merchant,
the law maritime, and the body of law between states which is now
called public international law.4
In that cosmopolitan era, though it might be forbidden to cite
English precedents,5 it was not unusual for American lawyers to be
familiar with Roman and civil-aw doctrines. Only narrowly did
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1. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796). In the language of a
modern English jurist, "they became bound by international law just in the same
way as an individual is bound by municipal law-that is to say, as an inevitable
result of birth into a society ruled by that law." SIR JOHN FISCHER WILLIAMS,
CHAPTERS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 14 (1929).
2. The Court held that the fourth article of the Peace Treaty of September 3,
1783, permitted recovery of debts ow;ed by Virginians to British creditors, in spite
of prior discharge of the debts by payment by defendants into the Virginia loan
office on April 26, 1780, in accordance with that state's act of October 20, 1777. It
was in Ware v. Hylton that Marshall argued, contrary to his famous holding in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that "the legislative authority
of any country can only be restrained by its own municipal constitution . . . and
the judicial authority can have no right to question the validity of a law, unless such
a jurisdiction is expressly given by the constitution." 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 211.
3. In Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, f14, 115 (Pa. Ct.
Oyer & Ter. 1784), "Chief Justice McKean proclaimed that the law of nations formed
"a part of the municipal law of Pennsylvania." Secretary of State Jefferson on
June 5, 1793, writing to the French minister, spoke of "the laws of the land, of
which the law of nations makes an integral part." 7 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 364 (Ford ed. 1904). In The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815), Mar-
shall said "the court is bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of
the land."
4. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U. PA. L. Rav. 26, 27 (1952) ; 1 CROSSNEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 568-76 (1953).
5. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 181 (1953). The
Pennsylvania statute forbidding citation of English post-revolutionary cases, except
"any precedent of maritime law, or of the law of nations," was the Act of March 19,
1810, P.L. 136. It was repealed by the Act of March 29, 1836, P.L. 224.
CHIP JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL
American municipal law escape a greater infusion of continental prin-
ciples than it in fact experienced."
It was therefore very natural that in the field of jus gentium,
where the law was professedly of more than parochial character, a very
eclectic spirit should prevail.
Lord Mansfield's familiar quotation from Cicero was made in a
case involving a shipowner's claim for freight: ". . . the maritime
law is not the law of a particular country, but the general law of nations:
'non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et
apud omnes gentes et omni tempore, una eademque lex obtinebit.' ""
And in discussing with the French minister a case pending in an
American prize court, Secretary of State Jefferson thus proclaimed the
universality of the law applied by such a tribunal: "It happens in this
particular case that the rule of decision will be, not the municipal laws
of the United States but the law of nations, and the Law maritime,
as admitted and practised in all civilized countries; that the same
sentence will be pronounced here that would be pronounced in the
same case in the Republic of France, or in any other country of
E urope. -. .8
Though the universality of the law of nations was clearly per-
ceived, as well as its dependence on the common consent of all civilized
nations rather than the dictates of one or a few great powers,' the
possibility of development and creative effort in the field of international
law was equally recognized. To such progress the United States itself
made notable cofitributions, especially in the matter of the rights of
neutrals."0 In this advancement of the law of nations John Marshall
played a significant part.
6. POUND, THE FoR.AkTIv ERA OF AmERICAN LAW 107 (1938). Jefferson con-
ceded "the superiority of the civil over the common law code, as a system of perfect
justice." Jefferson to John Tyler, June 17, 1812. 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOtAS
JEFFERSON 166 (Lipscomb and Bergh eds. 1904). "The lawyer finds in the Latin
language the -system of civil law most conformable with the principles of justice of
any which has ever yet been established, among men, and from which much has
been incorporated into our own." Jefferson to John Brazier, August.. 24, 1819.
15 id. at 210.
7. Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 882, 887, 97 Eng. Rep. 614, 617 (K.B. 1759).."Nor
will it be one law for Rome and another for Athens; one thing today and another
tomorrow; but it is a law eternal and unchangeable for all people and in every age."
T REPUBLIC OF Crcmo 256-57 (Hardingham ed. 1884). Regarding this quotation,
see Sutherland, The Flag, the Constitution, and International Agreements, 68 "H. v.
L. REv. 1374, 1381 (1955).
8. Jefferson to E. C. Genet, June 17, 1793: 7 THE Woixs OF THomiAs JEFFERSON.
402-03 (Ford ed. 1904).
9. In .Marshall's often-quoted words, "no prindple of general law is more uni-
versally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva
have equal rights. It results from this equality, that no'one can righifully impose
a iule on another... . As no nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can make
a law of nations ... " The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825).
10. DUMBAULD, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON xxxii, (1955).
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Marshall's fame as expounder of the Constitution tends to over-
shadow his achievements in other fields of law. Yet, during his tenure
as Chief Justice from 1801 to 1835, the Supreme Court rendered 62
decisions involving questions of constitutional law, of which Marshall
wrote the opinion of the Court in 36; while during the same period
195 cases were decided involving questions of international law or
relations, and in 80 of these Marshall was spokesman for the Court."
The noted international lawyer, John Bassett Moore, the first
American jurist to sit as a judge of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, says of Marshall: "He is known in other lands as the
author of important opinions on questions which deeply concern the
welfare and intercourse of all nations. In the treatment of questions
of international law he exhibited the same traits of mind, the same
breadth and originality of thought, the same power in discovering and
the same certainty in applying fundamental principles, that distin-
guished him in the realm of constitutional discussions; and it was his
lot in more than one case to blaze the way in the establishment of rules
of international conduct." 12
International law, like constitutional law, presented a new and
growing field where Marshall's powerful and perceptive mind could
build creatively. In the more technical and minute departments of law,
such as those dealing with commercial subjects, where erudition rather
than originality was required, Marshall did not excel." In such
branches of jurisprudence, his scanty legal education 14 had not made
him the equal of his studious colleague, Joseph Story.'
Much of Marshall's learning in the realm of international law
was derived from Thomas Rutherforth's Institutes of Natural Law.
This digest of Grotius was one of the few law books in Marshall's
library.' It was an influential treatise in that era, and Marshall relied
extensively on its teachings.
11. John Bassett Moore, John Marshall, in 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN
BASSETr MoORE 456, 458 (1944) (first published in 16 POL. Sci. Q. 393 (1901)). Of
an estimated 1106 decisions with opinions during Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice,
he wrote the opinion of the Court in 519. MORGAN, JusTicE WIr.LAm JOHNSON,
THE FIRST DISSENTER 176 (1954).
12. 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JoHN BAsSETr MOORE 458 (1944).
13. 3 id. at 16.
14. For about six weeks Marshall attended George Wythe's lectures at William
and Mary College. His notebook contains about 180 pages, some of which he may
have written after leaving school. 1 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE oF JOHN MARSHALL
154, 174-76 (1916). See also 2 id. at 177.
15. Regarding Marshall's intimacy with Story, see Warren, The Story-
Marshall Correspondence, 21 WM. & MARY COL. Q. 1 (2d ser. 1941).
16. ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL 9, 211 (1939).
Rutherforth's treatise was published at Cambridge, England, in 1754-56. In Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199, 230 (1796), Justice Chase speaks of "the celebrated
and judicious Doctor Rutherforth." The importance of Rutherforth's theories is
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Four epochs in Marshall's career deserve attention in appraising
his contributions to the development of the law of nations. In 1797,
he was a member of the XYZ mission sent to France by President
John AdamsY Marshall was greeted with acclaim on his return from
this abortive mission, in the course of which he had maintained a firm
and dignified position as representative of his nation. Marshall's
cogent statement of the American position in a lengthy communication
to Talleyrand, the French minister of foreign affairs, and his dispatches
to his own government constitute an impressive series of state papers
from his pen and deserve to rank as noteworthy diplomatic documents."
After Marshall's return to America and his election to Congress
in 1799, he again had occasion to deal with a problem involving the
law of nations. His speech in the House of Representatives on March
7, 1800, on the Jonathan Robbins case was one of the most effective
addresses ever delivered before that body. 9 John Bassett Moore thus
describes the incident: "By the twenty-seventh article of the Jay Treaty
it was provided that fugitives from justice should be delivered up for
the offense of murder or of forgery. Under this stipulation, Robbins,
alias Nash, was charged with the commission of the crime of murder
on board a British privateer on the high seas. He was arrested on a
warrant issued upon the affidavit of the British consul at Charleston,
South Carolina. After his arrest, an application was made to Judge
Bee, sitting in the United States circuit court at Charleston, for a writ
of habeas corpus. While Robbins was in custody, the President of
the United States, John Adams, addressed a note to Judge Bee, re-
questing and advising him, if it should appear that the evidence war-
ranted it, to deliver the prisoner up to the representatives of the British
exaggerated in 1 CRoSSrEY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 364. On Crosskey's contro-
versial notions of constitutional law, where undue reliance is placed on Rutherforth,.
see the present writer's review of Crosskey's book in 11 WM. & MARY COL. Q.
104, 105 (3d ser. 1954).
17. War with France seemed imminent when it became known that the American
mission had not been officially received, and that a loan or bribe had been solicited
by the French as a condition precedent to the commencement of serious negotiations.
Pinckney's irate reply, "No, not a sixpence," as it passed from mouth to mouth
became the more rhetorical, "Millions for defense, but not a cent for tribute."
Federalist plans for war with France received a setback when President Adams,
without consulting his party colleagues, announced that he would send another mission
to France if assurance were given in advance that it would be received with proper
respect for its diplomatic status. DUMBAULD, op. cit. supra note 10, at 197. 2 BEV-
ERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 256-351 (1916); 2 Am. STATE PAPERS (FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS) 161 (1832).
18. 2 Am. STATE PAPERS (FOREIGN RELATIONS) 157-82 (1832). Letters written
to George Washington during Marshall's sojourn in Europe also contain interesting
observations on international affairs. OSTER, THE POLITICAL AND EcoNomIc Doc-
TRINES OF JOHN MARSHALL 154-69 (1914).
19. Marshall's speech is printed in OSTER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 225-53 (1914).
Regarding this debate, see 2 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 458-75 (1916).
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government. The examination was held by Judge Bee, and Robbins
was duly surrendered. It is an illustration of the vicissitudes of
politics that, on the strength of this incident, the cry was raised that
the President had caused the delivery up of an American citizen who
had been impressed into the British service. For this charge there
was no ground whatever, but it was made to serve the purposes of the
day and was one of the causes of the popular antagonism to the admin-
istration of John Adams. When Congress met in December, 1799, a
resolution was offered by Mr. Livingston, of New York, severely con-
demning the course of the administration. Its action was defended in
the House of Representatives by Marshall, on two grounds: first, that
the case was one clearly within the provisions of the treaty; and, second,
that, no act having been passed by Congress for the execution of the
treaty, it was incumbent upon the President to carry it into effect by
such means as happened to be within -his power. The speech which
Marshall delivered on that occasion is said to have been the only one
that he ever revised for publication. It 'at once placed him,' as Mr.
Justice Story has well said, 'in the front rank of constitutional states-
men, silenced opposition, and settled forever the points of national law
upon which the controversy hinged.' So convincing was it that Mr.
Gallatin, who had been requested by Mr. Livingston to reply, declined
to make the attempt, declaring the argument to be unanswerable." 20
Upon becoming Secretary of State in the closing months of the
Adams administration, Marshall was again placed in a position where
his official duties brought questions of international law to his notice.
Negotiations with England regarding the functioning of the claims
commission set up under the Jay Treaty raised questions as to the scope
of the treaty provisions. Several other disputed points also required
attention. A treaty provision placing in the list of contraband "what-
ever may serve directly to the equipment of vessels" was being applied
so sweepingly by England that Marshall felt that no effect at all was
being given to the word "directly." He protested that the United
States deemed this construction "alike unfriendly and unjust." Another
subject of controversy arose when the British ignored the requirement
of international law that a blockade must be maintained effectively in
order to be legally valid. Moreover, Marshall directed a strong pro-
test against "the unjust decisions of their courts of Vice Admiralty
and the impunity which attends captures totally vexatious and without
probable cause of seizure." Conceding that it would be too much to
expect all the commanders of naval vessels and privateers to be "men
20. 2 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETT MOORE 453-54 (1944).
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of correct conduct and habits," he stressed the importance of an upright
judiciary to review the legality of their seizures. But the English
courts were no better than the seamen; they seldom restored a vessel
captured in violation of the law of nations and never awarded costs and
damages for detention; they were "converting themselves from judges
into mere instruments of plunder." The perennial problem of impress-
ment of sailors from American vessels was likewise acute. These
thorny topics occasioned Marshall's principal state papers in the field
of international affairs during this period."'
The fourth and final stage in Marshall's official career, where it
became his task to deal with matters relating to the law of nations, was
his tenure as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
To comment upon or analyze all of Justice Marshall's opinions upon
questions of an international character 2 is of course impracticable
here.a Mention must be made, however, of several of the most famous
opinions written by Marshall which are generally considered as land-
marks in the development of the law of nations."
Marshall's most widely known case in the field of international
law is, of course, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.5 An Amer-
ican vessel, which had been captured and confiscated by the French
and commissioned as a man-of-war, entered the port of Philadelphia
and was libelled by the original American owners, who demanded
restitution of their property. In an elaborate opinion rendered on
March 3, 1813, Marshall held that a public ship of a foreign state was
not amenable to the jurisdiction of an American judicial tribunal.
He pointed out that "the jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that
which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power."
Such jurisdiction is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by the
nation itself. "All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete
21. 2 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 500, 507 (1916) ; 2 Am. STATE
PAPERS (FOREIGN RELATIONS) 386-87, 486-90 (1832).
22. See text at note 11 supra.
23. A convenient digest of these opinions is ZIEGLER, op. cit. supra note 16.
Topics treated by Ziegler include international status, acquisition of territory, juris-
diction, nationality and expatriation, consuls, war, piracy, the slave trade, extradition
and treaties. Unfortunately, there is no published collection of these cases similar
to COTTON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS OF JOHN MARSHALL (1905) and DnLoN,
JOHN MARSHALL COMPLETE CONSTITUTIONAL DEcISIONs (1903). Some are found in
SCoTT, PUzE CASES DECIDED IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREM E, COURT 1789-1918
(1923).
24. International law cases decided by Marshall are discussed in 4 BEVERIDGE,
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 121-44 (1919) and in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN
BASSETT Moopx 459-63 (1944).
25. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). This case was discussed quite recently in
National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
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power of a nation within its own territories" must be based on its
express or implied consent.
26
Marshall then reviewed the classes of cases where an implied
consent to exemption from territorial jurisdiction is acknowledged.
These include the immunity enjoyed by the person of the sovereign
himself, by foreign ministers, and by armies permitted to pass through
a foreign territory." Should the same rule apply to ships of war
entering the ports of a friendly power? Or should such ships receive
the same treatment as private commercial vessels?
The Chief Justice concluded that a clear distinction is to be drawn
between merchant ships and public armed ships. The latter type of
vessel "constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under
the immediate and direct command of the sovereign; is employed by
him in national objects." 28
This famous litigation may be epitomized in the language used
by the writer's teacher of international law when the case was being
discussed in class: "The shipowner says 'Marshall makes a long speech
about visiting sovereigns, diplomats, and troops. That does not in-
terest me. Do I get my ship back or don't I?' and the answer is 'No.'"
Turning from exemptions from sovereign power to acquisition of
sovereign power, Marshall, in American Insurance Co. v. Canter 9
put an end to the controversy that his Federalist Party associates had
been waging regarding the legality of the Louisiana Purchase during
the administration of Thomas Jefferson." Marshall declared that
"the constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union,
the powers of making war, and of making treaties; consequently, that
government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by con-
quest or by treaty. . . . The right to govern may be the inevitable
consequence of the right to acquire territory." "
The occasion for this pronouncement was presented when the in-
surers, to whom the owners had abandoned a wrecked cargo, claimed
26. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136. Cf. Glass v. Sloop Betsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.)
6, 16 (1794).
27. Modem large-scale troop movements make it convenient for the rule of
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon to be waived by treaty in some cases, so that
offenses by soldiers may be punished in the local courts instead of exclusively by
military tribunals of the guest army. See article 7 of NATO Status of Forces
Agreement of June 19, 1951, which went into force on August 23, 1953. 48 Am.
J. INT'L LAW Ap,. 86-89 (1954).
28. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 144.
29. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
30. Jefferson himself had been dubious regarding the constitutionality of acquir-
ing this vast "empire for liberty." DUMBAULD, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 50, 144 (1955). Federalists feared that the political predominance of the
seaboard states would be destroyed. 3 RANDALL, THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
81 (1858).
31. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 543.
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356 bales of cotton which had been awarded to one Canter as salvage
by a court at Key West, Florida. The court had been created by an
act passed by the territorial legislature of Florida. The territorial
government in turn had been established by Congress, under provisions
which clearly gave it the power to establish courts having authority
to award salvage, unless it could be shown that a restriction was vio-
lated which forbade legislation "inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States."
The insurance company contended that such inconsistency ex-
isted, for the reason that the Florida statute vested in inferior courts
of the territory a jurisdiction given by Congress to the superior courts.
Section 8 of the Act of Congress of March 3, 1823, gave to the superior
courts of Florida "the same jurisdiction . . . in all cases arising under
the laws and constitution of the United States" as had been vested in
the Kentucky district court under prior legislation.
2
Marshall was prompt to point out that this did not confer on the
Florida superior courts all the powers possessed by the Kentucky court,
but only such jurisdiction as arose under the laws and Constitution of
the United States. The crucial question therefore was whether cases
in admiralty and cases under the laws and Constitution of the United
States were identical and to be treated as synonymous.
In holding that they were not identical, Marshall could avouch
the authority of the Constitution itself, which in article III, section 2,
had specifically enumerated these types of cases in separate categories,
each of which independently constituted a basis for jurisdiction of the
federal courts under that provision of the Constitution. He could
also point to the immemorial practice of maritime nations. "A case
in admiralty does not, in fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of
the United States. These cases are as old as navigation itself; and the
law admiralty and maritime, as it has existed for ages, is applied by
our courts to the cases as they arise." '
Finally, Marshall disposed of the argument that Congress could
not authorize the vesting of admiralty jurisdiction in territorial courts
because jurisdiction over "all cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction" was part of the "judicial power of the United States" which
article III, section 1, of the Constitution required to be vested in "one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish." Rather cavalierly, Marshall noted
that since the judges of the territorial courts held office for only four
years instead of for life as required by article III, section 1, of the
32. 3 STAT. 752 (1823).
33. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 545. See text at notes 7 and 8 supra.
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Constitution, "these courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which
the judicial power conferred by the Constitution on the general gov-
ernment, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They
are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sov-
ereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause
which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations.
respecting the territory belonging to the United States." 84 The dis-
tinction which Marshall thus improvised between constitutional and
legislative courts is still recognized. 5
A dictum in the Canter case to the effect that all the laws in force
in Florida when it was acquired by the United States, except political
laws, remained in force until altered by the new government " was
elaborated in United States v. Percheman." That case upheld the
title to 2,000 acres of land which the grantee had acquired under a grant
from the Spanish governor of Florida on December 12, 1815. That
territory was ceded to the United States by the treaty of February 22,
1819.
-Marshall remarked that "it is very unusual, even in cases of con-
quest, for the conqueror to do more than to displace the sovereign and
assume dominion over the country. The modem usage of nations,
which has become law, would be violated; that sense of justice and of
right which is acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world
would be outraged, if private property should be confiscated, and
private rights annulled. The people change their allegiance; their
relation with the ancient sovereign is dissolved; but their relations to
each other, and their rights of property, remain undisturbed. If this
be the modem rule, even in cases of conquest, who can doubt its appli-
cation to the case of an amicable cession of territory?" "8
Hence, in a transaction such as the treaty of 1819, "the king cedes
that only which belonged to him; lands he had previously granted,
were not his to cede." '9
The Spanish text of the treaty, the Court noted, contained a pro-
vision that such grants of land "shall remain ratified and confirmed."
34. Id. at 546.
35. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450 (1929). Not being constitutional
courts, such tribunals may be vested with administrative authority which goes beyond
"judicial" power.
36. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 544.
37. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
38. Id. at 87. In Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 126 (1814),
Marshall held that war does not automatically result in confiscation of enemy prop-
erty, but merely confers upon the belligerent sovereign a right to confiscate.
39. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 87.
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The English version of that article said "shall be ratified and con-
firmed." Rejecting the government's argument that the treaty con-
templated further subsequent action by the United States in order to
validate the titles involved, the Court construed the English text as-
harmonious with the Spanish.4°
Another legal landmark involving Spanish land grants was Foster
v. Neilson.41 The issue was title to land which the United States
claimed was part of the Louisiana Purchase, but which Spain had de-
clared was within West Florida. Petitioner claimed under a Spanish
grant made after the Louisiana Purchase but before the cession of
West Florida and would have prevailed had the Spanish position been
accepted. The Court refused to embark upon an independent investi-
gation of the boundary dispute. Such a question was a matter for the
political departments of the government. "In a controversy between
two nations, concerning national boundaries, it is scarcely possible, that
the courts of either should refuse to abide by the measures adopted by
its own government. . . . The judiciary is not that department of
the government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign
powers is confided; and its duty commonly is, to decide upon individual
rights, according to those principles which the political departments
of the nation have established. If the course of the nation has been a
plain one, its courts would hesitate to pronounce it erroneous. . . . A
question like this, respecting the boundaries of nations, is, as has been
truly said, more a political than a legal question and in its discussion,
the courts of every country must respect the pronounced will of the legis-
lature." In regard to the West Florida boundary controversy, Mar-
shall found that the legislature and the department entrusted with
foreign affairs had occupied the field, and that the American govern-
ment's position with respect to the disputed issue must be followed by
its courts.4
Marshall's distinction between political and justiciable questions
is still law.' A field in which it is particularly applicable is with
regard to recognition of foreign governments.
40. Id. at 89. The Court pointed out that in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
-253 (1829), where the same treaty language was involved, the Court's attention
had not been directed to the discrepancy between the two versions.
41. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
42. Id. at 307-09. Moreover the American position is intrinsically strong and
probably correct. Id. at 307.
43. See Martin, Executive Determination of Legal Questions, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE AMERICAN SocrETrY OF INTERNATIONA. LAw 53, 66-70 (1948). Some writers
contend that Marshall could have relied on the doctrine of "political questions" to
avoid judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). HAi-Es, THE A~mcRAN DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMAcY 201 (2d ed. 1932).
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The political character of recognition of international status was
clearly stated by Marshall in United States v. Palmer.' He pointed
out that "such questions are generally rather political than legal in
their character. They belong more properly to those who can declare
what the law shall be; who can place the nation in such a position with
respect to foreign powers as to their own judgment shall appear wise;
to whom are intrusted all its foreign relations; than to that tribunal
whose power as well as duty is confined to the application of the rule
which the legislature may prescribe for it. In such contests a nation
may engage itself with the one party or the other-may observe abso-
lute neutrality-may recognize the new state absolutely-or may make
a limited recognition of it. The proceeding in courts must depend so
entirely on the course of the government, that it is difficult to give a
precise answer to questions which do not refer to a particular nation.
It may be said, generally, that if the government remains neutral, and
recognizes the existence of a civil war, its courts cannot consider as
criminal those acts of hostility which war authorizes, and which the
new government may direct against its enemy. To decide otherwise,
would be to determine that the war prosecuted by one of the parties
was unlawful, and would be to arrange the nation to which the court
belongs against that party. This would transcend the limits prescribed
to the judicial department." 45
In United States v. Klintock,48 Marshall found it advisable to
elaborate on the Palmer decision. A United States citizen, having a
commission from one Aury, who styled himself "Brigadier of the
Mexican Republic and Generalissimo of the Floridas," took possession
of a Danish vessel, upon the pretext of finding Spanish papers which
he had "planted" on board the ship. Leaving the crew on a Cuban
island, the captors sailed for Savannah, impersonating the Danish
master and crew.
Marshall quickly disposed of the defendant's contentions.
Aury can have no power, either as Brigadier of the Mexican Republic,
a republic of whose existence we know nothing, or as Generalissimo
of the Floridas, a province in the possession of Spain, to issue com-
missions to authorize private or public vessels to make captures at
44. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
45. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 634-35. In Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 272
(1808), Marshall said: "It is for governments to decide whether they will consider
St. Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision shall be made, or
France shall relinquish her claim, courts of justice must consider the ancient state
of things as remaining unaltered, and the sovereign power of France over that
colony as still subsisting." This rule was followed in Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S.
(3 Wheat.) 246, 324 (1818), where Story spoke for the Court. See also United
States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 149-50 (1820).
46. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
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sea." " In any event, Denmark was not at war with either of those
imaginary sovereignties, and the Danish vessel "was not captured jure
belli, but seized and carried into Savannah animo furandi. It was not
a belligerent capture, but a robbery on the high seas. And although
the fraud practiced on the Dane may not of itself constitute piracy,
yet it is an ingredient in the transaction, which has no tendency to
mitigate the character of the offence." 48
Captures jure belli were not only distinguished by Marshall from
those animo furandi, as in the Klintock case, but also from those made
in the exercise of ordinary territorial sovereignty for violation of the
municipal laws of the local sovereign. According to this distinction,
which was elaborated with Marshall's customary logic in Rose v.
Himely,4" a belligerent seizure may be made on the high seas, because
war is waged on the high seas, but a seizure for the enforcement of
local laws must be made within the territorial jurisdiction of the
state80 Justice Johnson dissented" while Justices Livingston, Cush-
ing, and Chase concurred separately, expressing no opinion on the
question whether a seizure could be made lawfully on the high seas
for a violation of municipal regulations if the captured vessel were duly
brought into port without delay for adjudication. They based their
concurrence in the decision on the fact that the ship had been condemned
by a St. Domingo court without ever having been brought in to that
place at all.52
However, in Hudson v. Guestierf; a companion case decided on
the same day, Marshall upheld a condemnation pronounced under the
same circumstances as in Rose v. Himely, except that the seizure had
been made within French territorial waters. Here Chase and Living-
ston dissented because the captured vessel had not been brought into
47. Id. at 149.
48. Id. at 149-50.
49. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808). "The rights of war may be exercised on
the high seas, because war is carried on upon the high seas; but the pacific rights
of sovereignty must be exercised within the territory of the sovereign." Hence".. . seizure of a person not a subject, or of a vessel not belonging to a subject,
made on the high seas, for the breach of a municipal regulation, is an act which
the sovereign cannot authorize." Id. at 279.
50. Not necessarily within the "three mile limit." In Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 187, 234-35 (1804), Marshall said: "The authority of a nation within its
own territory is absolute and exclusive. . . . But its power to secure itself from
injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory." The geo-
graphical scope of such power may vary with circumstances. "In different seas and
on different coasts, a wider or more contracted range, in which to exercise the
vigilance of the government, will be assented to." See also Cook v. United States
288 U.S. 102, 112-15 (1933).
51. See MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 176-77.
52. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 281.
53. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 293 (1808).
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a French port for adjudication. 4 After retrial, it appeared that the
seizure had in fact been made on the high seas.r  Livingston, speaking
for the Court, said that "if the res can be proceeded against when not
in the possession or under the control of the court, I am not able to
perceive how it can be material whether the capture were made within
or beyond the jurisdictional limits of France; or in the exercise of a
belligerent or municipal right." 56 But the decisions on the first trial
and in Rose v. Himely had rejected the ground upon which the dissent-
ing judges had wished to place the decision. Marshall now found
himself a dissenter, observing "that he had supposed that the former
opinion delivered in these cases upon this point had been concurred in
by four judges. But in this he was mistaken. The opinion was con-
curred in by one judge. . . . However, the principle of that case (Rose
v. Himely) is now overruled." 57
When a ship was validly captured jure belli, what was the status
of neutral cargo which it carried on board? Justice Marshall dealt
with that problem in the Nereide,58 a case involving cargo which
belonged to a resident of Buenos Aires and which was shipped on an
armed British merchantman. The vessel was brought into New York
by an American privateer during war between the United States and
Great Britain."9 Marshall held that neutral property did not lose its
immunity from capture by being placed in a belligerent armed vessel.60
If the ship's armament, or resistance to search, prevents belligerents
from exercising their right of search, no harm is done. There is no
sin committed if neutral property escapes the inconvenience of search.
It is in any event immune from capture; and the right of search is
merely ancillary to the right of capture. The neutral property-owner
is not chargeable with the ship's being armed nor its resistance; all he
seeks is transportation for his goods. "He meddles not with the
armament nor with the war." 6'
54. Id. at 298.
55. Hudson and Smith v. Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281, 284 (1810).
56. Ibid.
57. Id. at 285. Cf. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804). See
ZIEGLER, op. cit. supra note 16, at 74; JEssuP, THE LAW OF TERRTORIAL. WATERS
AND MARIIME JURIsDICTION 85 (1927). MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 177,
criticizes Marshall's "lamentable lack of scruple concerning orderly legal procedure"
in announcing as the opinion of the Court a pronouncement which only one other
justice (evidently Washington) had approved. Todd, who came to the Court in
1808, agreed with Johnson. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 285.
58. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
59. Id. at 390.
60. Id. at 427. Story dissented.
61. Id. at 428.
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Rejecting the argument that a treaty between the United States
and Spain 2 subjected the goods of either party, being neutral, to con-
demnation as enemy property if found in the vessel of an enemy,
Marshall pointed out, with characteristic acumen, that the treaty merely
prohibited capture of enemy property when transported in neutral bot-
toms. It did not provide that enemy bottoms should communicate
their hostile character to the cargo they carried.' The object of this
type of treaty provision, Marshall explained, was to enlarge, not to
diminish, the rights of neutrals.64
Marshall again demonstrated the sanctity accorded in American
courts to the pledged faith of the nation as expressed in treaties in
United States v. Schooner Peggy. A convention with France, signed
on September 30, 1800, and ratified on February 18, 1801, provided
in article 4 that "property captured, and not yet definitively condemned
. . . shall be mutually restored." "' The Peggy had been condemned
in the court below on September 23, 1800, but an appeal was taken to
the Supreme Court." Marshall held that the condemnation was not
definitive, since it was subject to appellate review; and that since the
treaty was law of the land, the ship must be restored. Ordinarily, he
conceded, the function of an appellate court is only to determine whether
the judgment rendered below was or was not erroneous when rendered;
but if during the appeal, a controlling law intervenes, the Court must
obey it.6"
Another notable Marshall decision dealing with captures jure
belli was Talbot v. Seeman. 9 In that case, the Amelia, a Hamburg
ship, had been captured by the French (who were at peace with Ham-
burg), and then recaptured by Captain Talbot, of the Constitution, an
American ship. The Amelia was armed and was manned by a French
crew when captured. The United States and France were then in a
state of partial hostility, so that the recapture was lawful.70
The question for decision by the Court was whether Talbot was
entitled to salvage. As Marshall pointed out, for salvage to be awarded
62. Article 15 of the treaty of October 27, 1795, 8 STAT. 146 (1795).
63. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 418.
64. 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 419.
65. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
66. 2 MILLER, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AcTs OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AmERICA 459 (1931).
67. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 107.
68. Id. at 110. Marshall's decision agreed with President Jefferson's interpre-
tation of the treaty, but conflicted with the opinion of Attorney General Levi Lincoln.
1 WARREN, THE SUPREME CotRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 199 n.1 (1922).
69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801). In the circuit court, Burr and Hamilton were
opposing counsel in this case.
70. Id. at 32.
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it was necessary, not only that the taking be lawful, but that meritorious
service be rendered to the ship by the captor.7' Talbot contended, and
the Court held, that such a service had been rendered by rescuing the
vessel from the French. Normally, to recapture a neutral ship would
not be such a service, because the prize courts of the nation first cap-
turing the vessel would release it; but in the case at bar, there was proof
that France would have in fact condemned the Amelia, even though
such condemnation would violate international law.
As stated by Marshall, "the principle is that without benefit
salvage is not payable: and it is merely a consequence from this prin-
ciple, which exempts recaptured neutrals from its payment. But let a
nation change its laws and its practice on this subject; let its legislation
be such as to subject to condemnation all neutrals captured by its
cruizers, and who will say that no benefit is conferred by a recapture?
. . . It becomes then necessary to inquire whether the laws of France
were such as to have rendered the condemnation of the Amelia so
extremely probable, as to create a case of such real danger, that her
recapture by captain Talbot must be considered as a meritorious service
entitling him to salvage." 72
Whether the record before the Court contained adequate proof of
French law was the next question to be determined. Ordinarily foreign
law must be proved as a fact, which had not been done. Marshall
drew a fine distinction between internal law and public law on a sub-
ject of common concern to all nations. The latter type of foreign law,
important to a court of admiralty, included the French decree of Jan-
uary 18, 1798, which subjected to capture all merchandise produced
in England or in English possessions. Marshall concluded that "this
decree having been promulgated in the United States as the law of
France, by the joint act of that department which is entrusted with
foreign intercourse, and of that which is invested with the powers of
war, seems to assume a character of notoriety which renders it admis-
sible in our courts." 73 The Amelia, carrying a cargo from Bengal, an
English possession, was therefore not safe from condemnation in
French courts; and recapture by Captain Talbot was a genuine service
which entitled him to salvage. The Court could not presume that,
merely because the French decree of 1798 contravened international
law, the courts of that country would refuse to execute it.74
An American court, however, could in Marshall's judgment be
expected to display a nicer regard for the obligations imposed by the
71. Id. at 28.
72. Id. at 37.
73. Id. at 38. As to proof of foreign law, cf. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 187, 236-39 (1804).
74. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 39-41.
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law of nations. In determining what percentage should be awarded
as salvage, Marshall found it necessary to lay down the principle that
an act of Congress should be construed so as not to violate interna-
tional law."
The source of international law was discussed in Marshall's very
interesting opinion in The Antelope. 8 The question at issue was
whether the slave trade violated the law of nations. Marshall held,
contrary to a prior decision by Story at circuit,77 that it did not,
although it did violate the law of nature."
Slavery arose, Marshall asserted, as one of the consequences of
war in ancient times. "This, which was the usage of all, could not be
pronounced repugnant to the law of nations, which is certainly to be
tried by the test of general usage. That which has received the assent
of all, must be the law of all. . . . If we resort to this standard as the
test of international law, the question, as has already been observed,
is decided in favor of the legality of the trade." "7 However abhorrent
to many nations today, "that trade could not be considered as contrary
to the law of nations which was authorized and protected by the laws
of all commercial nations.. . . o
Common consent of all nations is required to modify international
law."' Condemnation of the slave trade by the domestic law of indi-
vidual nations is not enough. "If it be consistent with the law of
nations, it cannot in itself be piracy. It can be made so only by statute;
and the obligation of the statute cannot transcend the legislative power
of the state which may enact it." If it is neither piracy nor a violation
of the law of nations, slave trading cannot subject a ship in time of
peace to condemnation in a foreign forum, even if the laws of the ship's
own nation prohibit the trade.'
75. Id. at 43-44. In Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804), Marshall reiterated this principle.
76. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
77. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 Fed. Cas. 832, No. 1551 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).
78. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 120. Roman jurists recognized this same distinction.
DumBAuLD, THE DELAATxoN OF INDEPENDENcE AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY
43 (1950).
79. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) at 120-21.
80. Id. at 115. Marshall refers to the leading part taken by the United States,
after attaining independence, in opposing the slave trade. Earlier attempts by the
American colonies to suppress the trade had been disallowed by the crown. This
was one of the grievances complained of in the Declaration of Independence.
DUmBAuLD, op. cit. .-upra note 78, at 89, 174-75.
81. See the familiar description of the international legal structure quoted in
note 9 .nspra. During argument Key had asserted that "general concurrence"
sufficed; universal unanimity was not necessary. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 77.
82. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 122. "The courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another." Id. at 123. This principle had been enunciated by Marshall in
Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 280 (1808). See also Wisconsin v. Pelican
Insurance Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888). Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389
(1947).
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Marshall praised counsel who argued the case: "In examining
claims of this momentous importance-claims in which the sacred
rights of liberty and of property come in conflict with each other-
which have drawn from the bar a degree of talent and of eloquence,
worthy of the questions which have been discussed, this court must not
yield to feelings which might seduce it from the path of duty, and
must obey the mandate of the law." '
A strain of whimsical realism akin to that exhibited in Marshall's
treatment of slavery in The Antelope appears in Johnson and Graham's
Lessee v. McIntosh,4 a case dealing with the rights of Indians. The
plaintiffs claimed ownership of lands by virtue of grants made in 1773
and 1775 by Indian tribes. The Court held that these titles were
invalid. Only the government, not the Indians themselves, could dis-
pose of lands occupied by the natives. The Indians had a right to
occupy the lands which they inhabited, but "their power to dispose of
the soil, at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by
the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave title to those
who made it." The European nations "asserted the ultimate dominion
to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of
this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while yet in pos-
session of the natives." 85
The Christian nations of Europe had developed this system of
title by discovery in order to obviate conflicts among themselves in
connection with their acquisitions of land from the natives. They
needed to establish a rule "by which the right of acquisition, which
they all asserted, should be regulated, as between themselves. This
principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by whose
subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession. The
exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making
the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and
establishing settlements upon it. .-. . It was a right which all asserted
for themselves, and to the assertion of which, by others, all assented." "
Insofar as the natives were concerned, Marshall explains: "The
potentates of the old world found no difficulty in convincing themselves,
that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by
83. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 114.
84. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
85. Id. at 574. England and the United States had accepted this system of
land grants. Id. at 576, 580, 584. The principle expounded by Marshall has been
reiterated recently in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
86. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 573.
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bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange for un-
limited independence." 87
The foregoing review of Marshall's principal decisions involving
the law of nations exhibits the originality and cogency of his reasoning
in that important and untrodden branch of jurisprudence. His pro-
fessional prowess and proficiency as a creative genius are displayed in
his work there just as in the better known field of constitutional con-
struction. Of that work Beveridge says: "Admirable and formative
as were Marshall's opinions of the law of nations, they'received no
attention from the people, no opposition from the politicians, and were
generally approved by the bar." 18
Perhaps the same appraisal will apply to the achievements of the
present age in the realm of international law. A formative and creative
period, such as evoked the genius of Hugo Grotius 8' and of John
Marshall in their respective eras, confronts the legal profession today.'
If our efforts prove equally fruitful, we can afford to forego the popular
acclaim which falls to the lot of practitioners of less recondite skills."
Let us hope, too, that our efforts to build a law-governed world will
also escape the obstructive zeal of short-sighted and selfish politicians.92
And finally, thrice and four times blessed shall we be if we may aspire
to the accolade of approval by our comrades at the bar. There, if at
all, is to be found the "laurel crown." 9
87. Ibid.
88. 4 BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 144 (1919).
89. Pound, Philosophical Theory and International Law, 1 BIMOrHEcA
VISSMUANA 72 (1923); Dumbauld, Hugo Grotius: the Father of International Law,
1 J. PuB. L. 117 (1952).
90. That the American polity whose constitutional framework was moulded by
Marshall was in many respects itself an international society has been emphasized
by historians familiar with that period. WARREN, THE SUPREM~E COURT AND
SOVEREIGN STATES (1924); VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL (1948).
91. For Justice Robert H. Jackson's facetious comments on the esoteric char-
acter of international law, see PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SocIErY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 13 (1945). For a detailed description of the actual extent of the prac-
ticing lawyer's concern with international law, see Cowles, To What Extent Will
American Lawyers Need an Understanding of International Law to Serve Clients
Adequately During the Last Half of the Twentieth Century, 7 J. LEGAL ED. 179
(1954); Dean, The Role of International Law in a Metropolitan Practice, 103
U. PA. L. REv. 886 (1955).
92. Politicians dealing with international affairs too often exhibit "zeal . . . but
not according to knowledge." Romans 10:2. The agitation for the so-called
"Bricker Amendment" is a good illustration of this.
93. As Justice Holmes said, "the only thing that gives one real happiness is when
one whose judgment one respects says the few words that are the laurel crown,"
SHRIVER, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS Boo NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED
LETTERS AND PAPERS 200 (1936). How Holmes treasured the esteem of Cardozo is
familiar: "I not only owe to him some praise that I regard as one of the chief
rewards of my life, but have noticed such a sensitive delicacy in him that I should
tremble lest I should prove unworthy of his regard." Id. at 201. He spurned "the
commonplace, under its popular label of the normal." GLasGow, THE WOMAN
WITHIN 277 (1954).
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As Justice Holmes remarked, "there fell to Marshall perhaps the
greatest place that ever was filled by a judge; but when I consider his
might, his justice, and his wisdom, I do fully believe that if American
law were to be represented by a single figure, sceptic and worshipper
alike would agree without dispute that the figure could be one alone,
and that one, John Marshall." "
Did Marshall, like Taft, cherish ambition for the office of Chief
Justice as such? Or did he, like Holmes, long to "touch the super-
lative"? " In any event, Marshall's "intellectual power" gave him
rank with the immortals. 6 In two significant branches of public law
his work endures. As spokesman of the Constitution he is widely
known and acclaimed. Equal glory rightly attaches to his labors for
the development of the law of nations.
94. HOLmES, CoLLEcTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920). If a second figure were to
be chosen, it would doubtless be Holmes. Or would it be Pound, Wigmore, Williston,
John W. Davis, or George Wharton Pepper?
95. "He marked a fundamental difference in our way of thinking by saying
that this office always had been his ambition. I don't understand ambition for an
office. The only one that I feel is to believe when the end comes, for till then it is
always in doubt, that one has touched the superlative. No outsider can give you
that, although the judgment of the competent, of course, helps to confidence-or at
least to hope." 2 HOLMES-POLLOcK L=Erras 72 (Howe ed. 1941). ". . . [T]he
C. J. like the rest of us must depend on his intellectual power." 1 id. at 170.
96. There seems to be no evidence that Marshall loved high office as such. He
did welcome as a godsend his receiving a diplomatic appointment in 1797, but that
was because he needed the money. 2 BEvERmGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 211
(1916). His appointment as Chief Justice, Beveridge says, was "totally unexpected,"
and Marshall had himself recommended someone else for the place. 2 id. at 553.
See also 2 id. at 221, 491. In desiring to be Chief Justice, did not Robert H. Jackson
miscalculate the true nature of his own greatness? Ought he to have wished that
posterity would number him with names such as Ellsworth, Waite, Fuller, Chase,
or White, because of the exalted station they held, rather than with Holmes of the
laurel crown?
